During my tenure as Executive Director, Finance and Accounts, at the Transmission Company of Nigeria between 2013 and 2017, I developed a deeper understanding of the relationship between electricity, economic development and institutional competence. Working alongside engineers and other professionals, and engaging with the realities of Nigeria’s interconnected system and the West African Power Pool, reinforced a conviction that has remained with me: reliable electricity is fundamental to the prosperity of our country.
I approached that responsibility with a sincere determination to make a difference. From my financial perspective, a transmission line represented both an engineering asset and an investment whose value depended on maintenance, operational discipline and the electricity it actually delivered. A substation could support factories, hospitals, schools and entire communities. Its failure imposed costs far beyond the accounts of the electricity company.
My concern did not end when I left office. In my May 2021 ARISE News interview, I advocated the unbundling of TCN. In subsequent articles, I addressed preventive maintenance, financial governance, privatisation and the potential of technology to improve sector performance. These interventions reflect a continuing commitment to a sector whose success would transform the lives of Nigerians.
The central problem is that Nigeria has repeatedly changed the structure of its electricity industry without consistently securing the conditions necessary for that structure to work. Ownership, legislation and institutional names have changed. Reliable service has not improved sufficiently to meet the needs of a growing population.
Understanding why requires an honest examination of the entire value chain.
The legislation that established the modern reform framework was the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, enacted during President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration. It provided the foundation for restructuring the former state monopoly, establishing the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission and unbundling the industry into generation, transmission and distribution businesses.
The restructuring produced 18 successor companies: six generation companies, eleven distribution companies and TCN. The principal privatisation handover occurred on 1 November 2013, under President Goodluck Jonathan. Generation assets were sold or concessioned, while private investors acquired controlling interests in distribution businesses. TCN remained government-owned. The 2005 legal framework and the 2013 transactions were therefore distinct stages of the reform process.
The Electricity Act 2023 subsequently replaced the 2005 Act and opened further opportunities for state electricity markets. It also strengthened the framework for separating system operation from transmission asset ownership. NERC’s May 2024 order initiated the establishment of the independent system operator, and the Nigerian Independent System Operator, NISO, now has responsibilities encompassing system operation, market operation and planning. Any contemporary assessment must recognise this institutional development rather than describe TCN as though its structure has remained unchanged since 2013.
Nigeria’s difficulties, however, predate privatisation. The old public monopoly suffered from prolonged underinvestment, deteriorating equipment, poor commercial discipline and inadequate maintenance. Expansion failed to keep pace with population growth, urbanisation and economic ambition. The Bureau of Public Enterprises itself identifies obsolete infrastructure and weak management among the conditions that made reform necessary. Privatisation inherited these problems; it did not create all of them.
The question is why the new arrangements failed to resolve them adequately.
One reason is that purchasing an electricity company is fundamentally different from financing its rehabilitation. Acquisition payments transfer ownership. They do not automatically provide additional transformers, meters, functioning turbines, stronger distribution feeders or working capital.
In my October 2025 article on power-sector privatisation, I revisited my concern about heavily leveraged acquisitions and insufficient equity investment. That remains a crucial distinction. A business carrying substantial acquisition debt, while also facing deteriorated assets and uncertain revenue, enters a turnaround with severe constraints. Infrastructure requires patient capital and sustained technical competence.
Another weakness was the quality of the information underpinning the transactions. Reliable customer registers, asset-condition assessments and loss measurements are essential to valuation and performance commitments. In its subsequent defence of the privatisation process, BPE acknowledged that transactions proceeded with an assumed loss level of 25%, pending post-handover determination of actual losses. Although responsibility for the resulting disputes has been contested, the underlying lesson is clear: transferring assets before establishing dependable operating baselines creates avoidable conflict over tariffs, investment obligations and commercial expectations.
The scale of the challenge becomes clearer when we distinguish equipment on paper from electricity in use. And comparison with South Africa’s Eskom.
Indicator-verified figure, What it tells us:
Nigeria’s population in 2025 is approximately 237.5 million. The scale of the population the system must serve;
Grid-connected installed capacity reported by NERC, April 2026: 13,625 MW rated generating capacity, not dependable output Average available generation capacity, October 2026: 4,744 MW Capacity available for dispatch during that month Average generation, October 2026: 4,047 MW Actual average production, before downstream delivery losses
Eskom nominal generating capacity, FY2025: 46,866 MW. Eskom alone had substantially more capacity than Nigeria’s reported grid-connected fleet.
South Africa’s population in 2025 is approximately 64.7 million. A much smaller population supported by a larger electricity system
These figures have different reporting periods, expressly identified above. Eskom’s figure also excludes the additional 7,495 MW of independent-producer capacity supplying its group reported in the same annual report. Neither country’s installed capacity should be mistaken for continuously available generation.
Using Nigeria’s 2025 population as a reference, the October 2026 average grid generation amounted to approximately 17 watts per person, before losses. This is a calculation illustrating the scale of public-grid inadequacy, not an estimate of every Nigerian’s total electricity use: private generators, captive plants and distributed systems also supply electricity.
Annual electricity consumption offers another comparison.
Country Electricity consumption per person, 2024
Nigeria: Approximately 141 kWh
India: Approximately 1,223 kWh
South Africa: Approximately 3,308 kWh
The World Bank’s published series, drawing on IEA data, puts South Africa’s consumption per person at approximately 23 times Nigeria’s, and India’s at almost nine times Nigeria’s. These are economy-wide averages, including business and industrial consumption, rather than household allowances. They report electricity statistics, not a complete census of informal self-generation.
South Africa has experienced serious electricity difficulties of its own. It should not be presented as a flawless model. Nevertheless, the comparison reveals how far Nigeria must travel. A country cannot build a competitive industrial economy while supplying so little electricity to so many people.
From a financial standpoint, the most damaging feature of NESI is the interaction between inadequate service and inadequate cash recovery.
Customers receive unreliable supply and dispute bills. Distribution companies fail to recover sufficient revenue. Upstream payments fall short. Generators struggle to pay for fuel and maintenance. Gas suppliers become reluctant to extend further credit. Generation availability deteriorates, and the cycle begins again.
The IMF documented this chain of payment failures following privatisation: distribution companies’ inability to invest and meet obligations impaired payments to generators, which in turn affected gas suppliers. This is why the sector cannot be repaired by treating each company’s balance sheet as an isolated problem.
Debt must also be classified correctly. Acquisition loans owed to banks, unpaid customer bills, DisCo remittance shortfalls, government tariff-support obligations and unpaid generation invoices are different liabilities. Adding figures indiscriminately risks counting the same underlying shortfall more than once.
The scale is nevertheless substantial. In August 2025, the government approved a phased refinancing plan covering approximately ₦4 trillion in electricity-sector debt, principally outstanding generation invoices from 2015–2023. Approval of a repayment programme must not be confused with completed settlement. Its effectiveness depends on verification, actual disbursement and preventing fresh arrears.
Exchange-rate exposure compounds the problem. Equipment, spare parts and significant financing obligations carry foreign-currency costs, while most customer revenue is collected in naira. Depreciation can therefore raise costs sharply. High domestic interest rates and short loan maturities further weaken the financing of assets intended to operate for decades.
Tariffs sit at the centre of this difficulty, but the debate is too often reduced to competing slogans.
A sustainable tariff must recover the efficient cost of providing electricity, including maintenance and justified investment. It should not reward inflated procurement, avoidable losses or poor management. Where government chooses to keep a consumer’s tariff below that efficient cost, the difference must be transparently budgeted and paid.
Affordability is equally real. Households cannot be expected to absorb unlimited increases, especially when supply remains unreliable. Targeted support for vulnerable consumers is more defensible than broad subsidies that also benefit customers able to pay. The IMF’s reform analysis similarly identifies cost recovery, improved governance and protection through lifeline arrangements as complementary requirements.
My position is that tariff reform and service reform must proceed together. Customers should know what service they are paying for, how performance is measured and what remedy applies when that service is not delivered. Investors, in turn, need predictable regulation and confidence that approved revenue will not be undermined by unfinanced political decisions.
Metering is indispensable to this bargain.
NERC reported that, by June 2026, 7,743,839 of 12,589,486 active customer accounts were metered, a coverage rate of 61.51%. That represents progress but leaves approximately 4.85 million active accounts unmetered. These are accounts, not people; the figures do not measure the population still without any electricity connection.
Estimated billing has damaged confidence because the consumer cannot readily reconcile the bill with actual consumption. It creates opportunities for arbitrary charges, disputes and resistance to payment. NERC’s enforcement record shows that this concern is substantive: in 2024, it directed credit adjustments and announced regulatory revenue deductions of approximately ₦10.5 billion following non-compliance with estimated-billing caps.
Meters should be treated as essential operating infrastructure. Customer enumeration, feeder meters, transformer meters and functioning customer meters must be linked so that electricity entering a service area can be reconciled with electricity billed and money collected.
However, a prepaid meter does not repair an overloaded transformer, eliminate every illegal connection or make an unaffordable bill affordable. Metering must be accompanied by network investment, transparent dispute resolution and action against theft.
NERC’s 2024 annual report recorded aggregate technical, commercial and collection losses of 37.95%, compared with an allowed target of 24.73%. These combined losses include physical losses, commercial discrepancies and unpaid bills. They do not mean that 37.95% of electricity physically disappeared in the wires. Confusing financial collection losses with engineering losses obscures the remedies required.
The technical system presents an equally serious challenge. Generation depends on functioning equipment, dependable fuel supply and the ability to evacuate power. Nigeria’s gas resources do not automatically translate into reliable gas deliveries: pipelines, processing, commercial agreements, security and payment all matter.
Transmission requires sufficient capacity, alternative routes, well-maintained substations, correctly coordinated protection systems and accurate real-time information. Distribution requires adequate feeders, transformers and local network reinforcement. Additional generation will not solve a constrained distribution network; a new transmission line will not restore a turbine awaiting repairs.
The consequences of these interdependencies are documented. NERC’s account of the 28 March 2024 grid collapse identified generation losses associated with inadequate gas supply, a frequency decline, inadequate under-frequency load shedding and the absence of spinning reserve. A disturbance therefore escalated into a system-wide failure because several protective layers were insufficient.
The grid should not be described as uniformly obsolete: newer infrastructure coexists with ageing and constrained assets. Nor is the entire network a single radial line. The relevant questions are where alternative supply paths are missing, which components are overloaded, whether protection works and how quickly operators can identify and contain a disturbance.
NERC’s October 2026 factsheet still reported frequency and voltage indicators outside prescribed operating limits. This demonstrates why performance cannot be judged solely by occasional peak-generation announcements. Electricity must arrive consistently, at acceptable quality, and without exposing equipment or the wider system to unnecessary risk.
My reservations about the Manitoba Hydro International management contract must be understood within this wider institutional context.
The contractor was Manitoba Hydro International, or MHI. Its three-year arrangement began in 2012 and was extended to July 2016. Its mandate covered TCN’s transmission, system and market operations, together with training and institutional improvement. It was not contracted to control Nigeria’s entire generation, gas-supply and retail-distribution chain.
In my 2021 television intervention, subsequently reported in the press, I criticised the arrangement and questioned its suitability for the transformation Nigeria needed. My assessment remains that importing a management team was an inadequate substitute for a properly funded, clearly governed institutional reform. Foreign technical participation can be useful; its value depends on demonstrated capability, effective authority, measurable obligations and durable transfer of knowledge.
Fairness requires acknowledging that TCN’s July 2015 public statement credited the MHI–TCN partnership with improvements in wheeling capacity, transmission losses and reported system-collapse frequency. Those official claims should form part of the assessment alongside criticisms of the arrangement. An independent evaluation should reconcile the contract, verified results, costs and the sustainability of improvements. My criticism is strongest when directed at the design and effectiveness of the arrangement, rather than attributing every national electricity failure to one contractor.
Governance extends far beyond that contract.
In my November 2024 article, I recalled the work of my team, the board and supporting officials of the Ministry of Power in ensuring TCN’s financial external audit. That experience reinforced my belief that Nigeria possesses capable professionals. What they require is an environment in which transparent accounting, technical judgement and proper controls are supported consistently.
Corruption risks must be addressed through evidence and enforceable controls. Procurement inflation, conflicts of interest, diversion of collections, fraudulent certification and the supply of substandard equipment should attract independent investigation and sanctions where established. Equally, not every failed project proves corruption: inadequate design, funding interruptions and weak project management can produce failure without theft.
Vandalism, electricity theft and non-payment also damage the system. Government institutions should not demand commercial discipline from operators while neglecting their own verified bills. Utilities must enforce payment obligations fairly, while providing accessible channels for legitimate complaints.
International experience provides useful comparisons, but no single country offers a formula Nigeria can simply copy. The World Bank’s comparative research reaches an important conclusion: reform must reflect local conditions, and well-governed public utilities can sometimes match private operators’ efficiency. My objection is therefore to poor performance and weak accountability under either ownership model. A private monopoly without effective regulation can disappoint consumers just as a neglected public monopoly can.
Efficient grids operate through disciplined preparation for failure. European system-operation practice, for example, uses the N−1 criterion: the network should withstand the loss of a major component without breaching security limits. Operators coordinate outages, maintain reserves, monitor the system continuously and prepare restoration procedures. These arrangements reduce the likelihood that one fault becomes a widespread blackout.
Nigeria needs this operational discipline alongside investment in hardware. NISO’s independence must be practical: clear authority, reliable data, competent personnel and transparent decision-making. Transmission asset ownership, dispatch decisions, market settlement and regulatory oversight should have distinct accountabilities.
I remain convinced that recovery is possible. My proposed programme would place responsibilities and measurable outcomes ahead of another round of general promises.
The Way Forward For Nigeria’s Electricity Sector:
1. Establish a verified sector baseline within six months. Reconcile dependable generation, fuel constraints, network bottlenecks, customer accounts, metering gaps and liabilities. Publish which assets work, which do not, what repairs cost and who is responsible.
2. Restructure debt while stopping new arrears. Verify claims independently, publish settlement schedules and connect support to operational improvements. Ring-fence appropriate revenue flows and require government institutions to budget for and pay electricity bills. Refinancing without cash-flow reform merely postpones another crisis.
3. Require credible recapitalisation of weak operators. Assess fresh equity, technical capability and investment delivery separately from acquisition payments. Where owners cannot meet binding obligations, pursue transparent restructuring, new investment or lawful changes of control. Avoid both indiscriminate reversal of privatisation and indefinite protection of failing owners.
4. Pair tariff reform with consumer protection. Publish efficient costs, fund targeted assistance and enforce service obligations. Customers must receive understandable bills and remedies for verified overcharging or service failures. Operators should face demanding but realistic loss-reduction targets.
5. Close the metering gap with independently verified delivery. Measure progress by functioning meters, accurate billing and reduced losses. Reconcile feeder and transformer energy with customer consumption, and ensure that faulty meter replacement does not become a route back to indefinite estimated billing.
6. Finance reliability as a core service. Prioritise maintenance, protection coordination, reserve provision, control-room visibility, black-start capability and critical spare equipment. Evaluate projects by the dependable electricity they unlock and the outages they prevent, not merely by contract value or commissioning ceremonies.
7. Coordinate the whole investment chain. Align gas infrastructure, generating plants, transmission projects and distribution upgrades. Resolve land, right-of-way and security issues early. Require realistic construction schedules, competent supervision and post-completion performance checks.
8. Build credible state markets and distributed supply. State regulators need technical capacity, independence and coordination with federal institutions. Support embedded generation, industrial clusters and mini-grids without creating incompatible rules or abandoning less profitable communities.
9. Protect competence and strengthen accountability. Appoint qualified boards and managers, invest in workforce training and conduct independent incident investigations. Publish audited accounts, procurement information and performance data. Enforce sanctions through evidence and due process.
10. Use digital technology and AI under responsible human oversight. Apply analytics to equipment condition, demand forecasting, revenue reconciliation and suspicious consumption patterns. Begin with reliable data and secure operational systems. AI can support engineers and commercial teams; it cannot replace fuel, functioning equipment or accountable management.
There are foundations on which to build. Metering coverage is improving. Private generation investment has demonstrated that projects can attract capital. NISO provides an opportunity for clearer operational accountability, while decentralisation can bring decisions closer to local needs.
Distributed energy also offers a practical route to progress. The World Bank’s $750 million DARES programme, approved in 2023, aims to provide new or improved electricity access to more than 17.5 million Nigerians. That is a programme objective, not a completed achievement. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the scale of opportunity available when public support and private delivery are organised around measurable access outcomes.
Success should ultimately be measured in customers’ lives: fewer and shorter outages, dependable voltage, transparent bills, lower expenditure on backup generation and more productive businesses. Peak megawatts alone cannot capture that transformation.
I gave my best during my years at TCN because I understood what a stable electricity system could unleash. I retain that conviction. Reliable power would allow manufacturers to plan production, small businesses to retain earnings otherwise spent on fuel, hospitals to operate with greater confidence and young Nigerians to compete in a digital economy.
Nigeria has the resources and professional talent to achieve this. What it needs is continuity of policy, disciplined financing, capable institutions and a determination to enforce responsibility throughout the value chain.
The electricity sector must finally be judged by the reliable power delivered to Nigerians and by the opportunities that power enables.
About the author:
Sonny Iroche served as Executive Director, Finance and Accounts, at the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) from 2013 to 2017, following his appointment by President Goodluck Jonathan for a four-year contractual term. Under his leadership, the Finance Directorate successfully facilitated the first-ever external audit of TCN’s accounts, conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).

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