Sports / Nigeria

State police: Who will police governors?

For years, state governors have complained that they are, in theory, their states’ chief security officers. They argue that, in practical terms, they cannot be regarded as such because they have no control over the commissioners of police in their states.

Despite this clear limitation, whenever killings, kidnappings or communal clashes occur in a state, the first person citizens look to is the governor. Even at the federal level, the governor is often expected to provide information on what is happening. In response, the governor visits victims, holds emergency security meetings and announces immediate measures.

State governments also spend substantial resources supporting the police with vehicles and other logistics. They announce security measures and fund security operations. Yet, the commissioners of police operating in their states belong to a federal institution and ultimately answer through the police hierarchy to Abuja. How then can somebody be described as the chief security officer of a state when the police operating in that state are not under his control?

After years of complaints, Nigeria now appears closer than ever to changing this arrangement. The constitutional amendment process has moved the state-police question from political rhetoric towards an actual decision. State Houses of Assembly are considering constitutional amendments transmitted by the National Assembly, with the proposal requiring the constitutionally prescribed support of state assemblies before it can proceed.

Interestingly, however, reports indicate that the response from the states has been slower than expected. It appears that the same political class that has spent years demanding state police has become more cautious now that the opportunity to create it is within reach.

Nigeria has millions of people spread across 36 states and 774 local government areas, yet policing remains heavily centralised. A police officer may be posted to a community where he doesn’t understand the language, doesn’t know the terrain and doesn’t fully understand local disputes. Meanwhile, criminals often possess precisely that local knowledge. Can Abuja realistically police every forest, village, highway and neighbourhood in Nigeria?

Twenty years ago, state police could perhaps be treated largely as a constitutional or political argument. Today, Nigeria faces kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, farmer-herder conflicts and other forms of organised crime. The security environment has forced the country to reconsider whether one centrally controlled police structure is sufficient.

Nigeria already has something resembling state policing. Because the federal police cannot meet all local security needs, states and regions have created different security outfits. They include Amotekun in the South-West, Hisbah organisations in parts of the North, Ebube Agu initiatives in parts of the South-East, neighbourhood safety corps and various community vigilante groups. In practical terms, Nigeria has already been decentralising aspects of security without fully decentralising policing powers.

Local knowledge is one of the strongest arguments in favour of state police. A locally recruited officer is more likely to know the terrain, language, communities and peculiar security challenges than someone transferred from hundreds of kilometres away.

Another argument is faster response. Under a properly structured state-police system, personnel and resources could potentially be deployed more quickly. A governor shouldn’t have to wait for instructions travelling through layers of federal bureaucracy during an emergency. State governments could also tailor policing priorities to their peculiar security problems.

But the fear of state police isn’t irrational. Nigeria’s political history gives reasons for caution. Imagine a governor controlling the state budget, wielding enormous influence over political appointments and exercising unchecked control over an armed police force. Then imagine an election approaching. What happens to opposition politicians? What happens to protesters, journalists and activists? What happens to lawmakers who fall out with the governor? State police could bring policing closer to the people, but it could also bring political coercion closer to the people.

Then again, is the federal police never abused politically? We have seen allegations over the years of police being deployed against opposition figures, political gatherings, protesters and activists. Centralisation, therefore, does not automatically guarantee neutrality.

The concern shouldn’t simply be whether state police can be abused. Of course it can. The more important question is whether Nigeria can design institutions that make such abuse difficult, detectable and punishable.

State police must belong to the state as an institution, not to the governor as an individual. Each state police force should have an independent oversight commission, with membership broad enough to prevent its domination by the governor. Such a body could include representatives of government, opposition parties, the legal profession, civil society, traditional institutions and retired security professionals.

If the governor alone appoints the head of the state police, political dependence becomes a legitimate concern. Nigeria could consider a system where an independent state police service commission recommends candidates, the governor makes a nomination and the state House of Assembly confirms the appointment, with removal permitted only on clearly defined grounds. The precise arrangement can be debated, but the principle should be clear: no single politician should possess unilateral control over an armed police institution.

The legal framework should also explicitly protect lawful political activity. State police officers should not be allowed to disrupt lawful political meetings, prevent opposition campaigns, seize campaign materials without lawful authority, arrest candidates for political reasons or interfere improperly with electoral processes. The Independent National Electoral Commission should retain its constitutional and statutory responsibilities over elections, with clearly defined arrangements for coordinating election security among relevant federal and state agencies.

State police also doesn’t necessarily mean abolishing the Nigeria Police Force. The federal police could retain responsibility for specified federal and interstate offences, terrorism and other crimes that cross state boundaries, while state police concentrate largely on offences and security challenges within individual states. The jurisdictions would need to be clearly defined to avoid conflicts.

Another major problem often overlooked is funding. Lagos and Rivers states can probably finance relatively sophisticated police forces. But what about states heavily dependent on Federation Account allocations and already struggling with other financial obligations? Would Nigeria end up with first-class policing in wealthy states and poorly equipped police forces in poorer ones?

There may therefore be a need for minimum national policing standards and some form of funding arrangement that ensures that a Nigerian’s access to basic security does not depend entirely on the financial strength of his or her state.

If governors have long demanded state police, why are state legislatures slow to approve the constitutional amendment? Perhaps it is because of concerns over safeguards, political calculations, uncertainty about financing, fear of abuse or simply the usual slow legislative process.

Whatever the explanation, the hesitation may not necessarily be a bad thing. This is not an amendment that should be passed merely because state police sounds attractive or because insecurity has made Nigerians desperate for solutions. States should interrogate the details carefully.

Nigeria’s worsening insecurity has made the case for decentralised policing increasingly difficult to ignore. Abuja cannot know every forest, street, community and criminal network across 774 local government areas. Police officers, closer to the communities they protect, can bring local knowledge, better intelligence and potentially faster response.

But decentralisation without adequate safeguards could simply move the abuse of police power from Abuja to Government Houses. Nigeria probably needs state police. What Nigeria does not need are 36 governors with private armies.

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Originally published by Punch
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