Politics / Africa

Sudan: Sudan's State Collapse - Canary in the Coal Mine for International Peace and Security

Sudan: Sudan's State Collapse - Canary in the Coal Mine for International Peace and Security

Sudan's harrowing state implosion since war resumed in 2023 presents a warning for other states in Africa and elsewhere currently heading in that direction as well as stark dilemmas for U.S. foreign policy.

Just as Somalia's state collapse provided an instructive example in the 1990s, Sudan is experiencing a much more consequential slide into a country where multiple international security and peace threats emerge, from chemical weapons to interconnected conflicts throughout a broad regional swathe to the world's most devastating humanitarian crisis. Sudan's state collapse is a canary in the coal mine for similar countries at risk from Libya to Lebanon to Haiti to multiple neighbors, first and foremost South Sudan.

Sudan's collapse is a canary in the coal mine for countries at risk from Libya to Lebanon to Haiti to multiple neighbors. 

At a moment when there are more simultaneous conflicts globally since WWII, Sudan's war stands out in its size and scope.  The numbers are staggering.  It is the world's largest displacement crisis, with 14 million people rendered homeless by the violence.  It is the world's largest hunger crisis, with 40% of the country's population facing acute food insecurity.  And it is arguably the world's largest sexual violence crisis.  The UN's Tom Fletcher concluded, "Sudan is an atrocities laboratory: sieges, denial of food, weaponized sexual violence…"

As the fighting rages on, the crisis only will metastasize, as fertilizer and fuel shortages due to the Iran conflict increase the cost of food, thus driving millions more into extreme hunger.

The funding gaps are gaping, with UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the UN High Commission for Refugees all facing shortfalls between 70 and 85 percent of assessed needs.  That directly translates into more starving kids, more virulent epidemics, etc.

The roots of Sudan's collapse share commonalities with other states in extreme distress. 

Sudan's case is extreme but not isolated.  The roots of its collapse share commonalities with several other states in extreme distress.

First, state capture.  For decades, Sudan's rulers and their external collaborators have hijacked state institutions for private gain, creating a classic violent kleptocracy.  A coalition of thieves of state ruled the country, and then fell out over its spoils, as thieves do, tearing the country apart in the process.  The worst abuser of human rights, the genocidal militia known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was originally a collection of racist militias known as the Janjaweed, subsequently organized by Sudan's long-time dictator Omer al-Bashir to fight an incipient rebellion in Darfur.  Unsurprisingly, as those militias grew in power and acquired greater wealth, they turned on their former government benefactors and made a play for raw power, leading to massive civil war, total state collapse, and the possible further partitioning of the country.

Second, resource extraction.  Sudan's rich resources, particularly oil and gold, have been pillaged by successive governments, allied militias, rebel groups, and unscrupulous external actors.  Parasitic multinational networks have created an assembly line of violently extracted and smuggled raw materials in Sudan and many other failing states, enriching a handful of insiders and outsiders while the communities and countries are ravaged economically and environmentally.  The result is war as an economic system fueled by resource extraction, smuggling, checkpoint taxation, and the fleecing of humanitarian aid efforts.  In Sudan and other African states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, the global acceleration in the price of gold has led to ever more violent contestations over control of the mining and trafficking of conflict gold, particularly to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE imports well over $1 billion worth of illicit gold from Sudan per year.

Third, environmental poisoning.  As part of the gold rush in Sudan and many other countries, increased artisanal mining is contributing to public health emergencies resulting from chemicals poisoning the groundwater, soil, and communities surrounding the mines.  Agricultural communities near the mines in River Nile state now say that crop production has decreased by up to 80% to 90% due to toxic chemicals used in gold mining.

Fourth, external intervention.  The Cold War construct of the United States versus the Soviet Union has been replaced in Sudan by a raging rivalry between the UAE backing the RSF and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Russia backing the rival Sudan Armed Forces.  At a recent international donors' conference in Berlin on the Sudan crisis, the UAE and Saudi Arabia tanked the joint communique because the Emirates couldn't even agree to the Saudi insistence on preserving "state institutions."  The rise of the so-called Middle Powers has created a more complex chessboard in war-torn states from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Yemen where external actors pour in arms and/or trade in conflict resources such as gold with no consequences, as they pursue conflicting agendas related to influence and resources that make mediation efforts much more challenging.

Fifth, weapons systems. Provided by Iran, Egypt, Türkiye, and especially the UAE to the belligerents, attack drones have become the weapon of choice in Sudan, representative of a trend also seen in conflicts as far afield as Iran, Ukraine, and Mali.  The use of these drones has completely changed the nature of warfare.  The usual ebb and flow of conflict related to seasonal rains has been rendered moot; attacks on civilian targets can be mounted from further away with deadly accuracy.  The cost of a quick and dirty "offensive" can be minimal for the attacker, but devastating for the target, usually civilian.  Recently, there has been a surge of drone attacks on food distribution efforts, which ties drone strikes directly to increased starvation. Even more alarmingly for international security, the Sudan Armed Forces were recently found to be using chemical weapons—chlorine gas bombs—in violation of international arms treaties.

Sixth, failed crisis response.  In Sudan, international efforts at brokering a semblance of peace, creating accountability for massive war crimes, providing consistent humanitarian assistance, and countering abject state collapse have all failed spectacularly.  More broadly, in response to wars around the world, the UN system and various regional entities have proven unable to develop crisis response mechanisms relevant to evolving conflict dynamics.

Seventh, eroding U.S. relevance.  The United States still has the most leverage over the external patrons in Sudan, and using that in coordination with a more sophisticated mediation effort would hold the biggest potential for peace in Sudan. But the U.S.  has been unwilling to use that leverage in any meaningful way, particularly regarding US allies UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, who are all pouring gasoline on Sudan's inferno by supporting the armed factions.  The US says it is focused on getting both sides to accept a humanitarian truce and to commit to an inclusive political dialogue to lead to a civilian government, but the cold reality is that kind of soft diplomacy can never succeed without changing the conflict's lucrative financial incentives, which in turn requires impacting the calculations of the external backers to the conflict. Sudan and other crisis-torn countries perceived to be less strategically important have been downgraded on the Washington mattering map, leaving in tatters peace processes and the failed elite bargains on which they were built.

Eighth, regional security risks. Sudan's war now risks spreading into a regional war, as several of its neighbors have supported one faction or another. The recent resumption of war in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, is a case in point, as Ethiopia has been supporting the RSF (a claim they reject), and now the Sudan Armed Forces may be supporting the Tigrayan rebels against the Ethiopian government (a claim the SAF deny). Sudan's state collapse and Ethiopia's renewed conflict are now risking a wider regional war, which could engulf other countries including Eritrea, Chad, and others, while also having connections to Yemen. This is already creating significant concerns for U.S. foreign policy in the region, which could escalate.

The playing field in Sudan and other collapsing or failed states has become wildly skewed in favor of elite networks that have captured state institutions for their own gain; in Sudan's case, the contest over these hijacked institutions has led to their utter destruction.  At the same time, an assault has unfolded on pro-democracy and anti-corruption human rights advocates, the free press, independent legislatures and judiciaries, women's organizations, and any other independent voice.

A different crisis response paradigm is needed - kleptocratic war machines, including their multinational facilitators, need to be dismantled.

In response to this new, more dangerous era, a different crisis response paradigm is needed.  To level the playing field and give peace and democracy a chance, the kleptocratic war machines, including their multinational facilitators, need to be dismantled, or at least more substantially weakened, and the incentives that sustain these war economies need to be disrupted.

This can be achieved if the US, UK, European Union, and other states with influence deployed much more robust sanctions against networks of corrupt officials, weapons suppliers, conflict gold traffickers, and companies they control, as well as anti-money laundering measures. Whole-of-government pressure of this nature is usually reserved for high-level national security issues.  It's time to enhance the tools used for Sudan and other developing cases of state collapse.

Additionally, non-governmental organizations can create impact through campaigns aimed at undermining the reputation laundering strategies of some of the key arms-providing countries, like Emirati and Saudi sportswashing efforts using commercial branding deals with leagues, teams and tournaments from multiple sports around the world.  More systematic and focused countering of the networks and actors benefiting from chaos and predation is critically needed.

Simultaneously, the constituencies for peace and reform in Africa need far greater support.  Without more tangible assistance to the local groups pressing for system change, it's hard to imagine progress.

In Sudan, that means supporting the Emergency Response Rooms, women and youth organizations, unions, local peace committees, and other local institutions that can provide the backbone of social reconstruction, and not trotting out the same tired, failed diplomatic models of power sharing involving only the most heavily armed factions.  Sudan is Exhibit A for how that mediation strategy has spectacularly failed.

This is a moment to rethink how the U.S. and the world respond to national implosions and to cobble together … a more effective way forward.

Sudan's complete state collapse and ensuing rising threats to international peace and security -  along with a massive border-crossing humanitarian crisis - are a harbinger of things to come for other countries on similar trajectories that begin with predatory state capture.

This is a moment to rethink how the United State and the world respond to such national implosions, and to cobble together the coalition of civil society organizations, multilateral institutions, and concerned governments that can begin to envision a more effective way forward.

Sasha Lezhnev is a Senior Policy Adviser at The Sentry, which John Prendergast co-founded.

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Originally published by AllAfrica
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